Brickell, Simmons and others have discussed doubly perfect authentication systems in which an opponent's chance of deceiving the receiver is a minimum for a given number of encoding rules. Brickell has shown that in some instances to achieve this minimum the system needs to have splitting. Such a system uses a larger message space. Motivated by Brickell's ideas we consider authentication systems with splitting and the problems of reducing the message space. 
Authentication
We use the model of authentication described by Simmons [9, 10] and Brickell [1] .
There are three participants involved in this model; a transmitter T, a receiver R and an opponent O. T wants to communicate some infonnation to R. It is not necessary that the information be kept secret, but R wants to be sure that the information did indeed come from T.
An item of information that the transmitter might want to send to the receiver is called a source state, and we denote by S the set of source states. We assume that there is some fixed probability distribution Ps on S (P s (') is the probability that s E S is to be communicated on any given occasion).
In order to relay a source state s E S to R, T encodes it (using some encoding rule chosen from a set I of encoding rules) as a message m and sends m to R.
In order for R to be able to determine which source state is being relayed it is necessary that for any given encoding rule a message m can relay at most once source state under that rule. T and R agree on which encoding rule they will use before communication starts.
Let M be the set of messages that T can send to R. Let (9, 9, 3) 
c f h The opponent 0 attempts to get R to accept some information that did not come from T. If 0 knows which encoding rule T and R have agreed upon then o may succeed with probability 1. We assume that T and R share an encoding rule in secret for each transmission and that the encoding rule is chosen according to a probability distribution PIon the set I of encoding rules. 0 may deceive R by impersonation or substitution. 0 impersonates T by sending a message when in fact T has not sent a message. 0 is successful if R accepts the message as authentic. If T sends a message m, relaying source state s, then 0 may intercept it and substitute a different message m'. 0 is sucessful if R accepts the substituted message m' and this message relays a source state different form s.
If i E I and there exists ml 'I m2 such that !i(ml) = !i(m2) 'I 0 then we say splitting occurs in encoding rule i. If splitting occurs then two or more messages may relay the same source state for some encoding rule. In this case T also chooses a splitting strategy. Given that encoding rule i E I and the source state 8 E S are used, a splitting strategy determines the probability that T sends message m for each message m with may relay sunder i.
An optimal strategy for T is a probability distribution PIon the set I of encoding rules and a splitting strategy which minimizes the probability that 0 may successfully deceive R. This probability is denoted by Va and is a measure of the security afforded by the authentication system. We refer to A' as a cartesian authentication array.
Example 2:
Cartesian authentication array ,corresponding to AS(9, 9, 3) of Example 1.
Source
Brickell [1] has constructed cartesian doubly perfect authentication systems using cartesian authentication arrays which he has called orthogonal multi-arrays.
fying (i) aij is a r j-subset of the set { 1, 2, ... , r j} and eli) given integers x, y with exists exactly one i such that ml E air and m2 E ajy. An OMA(k,n;rl1 ... ,Tk)
corresponds to a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with b = n complete set. Complete sets of mutually orthogonal latin squares are known to exist when n is a prime power. If there do not exist k -2 mutual orthogonal latin squares of order n then a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with VG = lin and lSI = k must have splitting. For example, since there does not exist a pair of orthogonal latin squares of order 6, a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with VG = 1/6 and IS\ = 4 must have splitting. In such a case v > 24. Brickell [1] gives an example of an OMA(4,6j 1, 1, 1,2). This example corresponds to an authentication system with v = 30. This is the minimum size of M that such a system arising from an OMA can have. The following example shows that it is possible for a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with VG = 1/6 and lSI = 4 to have fewer than 30 messages.
This example is a cartesian authentication array corresponding to a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with VG = 1/6, lSI = 4 and v = 26.
Stinson [11] has used transversal designs to construct a cartesian authentication system with VG = 1/6, lSI = There are two problems:
(1) for a given n find the largest integer k such that there exists a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with Va = lin and lSI = k.
(2) for given nand k find a cartesian doubly perfect authentication system with the minimum number of messages.
These problems correspond to constructing designs admitting partitions of the blocks having the properties described above with the maximtun ntunber of blocks.
The largest value of k is n + 1 and the minimwn number of blocks is kn. These solutions correspond to orthogonal arrays. See Stinson [11] for a description of these systems in terms of transversal designs. By making suitable identifications of symbols in an array arising from mutually orthogonal F -squares, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Suppose there exi"t k -2 mutually orthogonal F(n, At)-"quare$ (nec-
e""arily n = At). Then there exi"t" a carte"ian authentication "y"tem AS( n 2 , kn/ >., k) with VG = >'/ n. 
. 0 " ,
F, (6,2 ,4 ) Seberry [8J has shown how to construct a set of n -1 mutually orthogonal FC n; ,\ t)-squares using a generalized. Hadamard matrix of size n = At with entries from a group G of order t.
Several families of generalized Hadamard matrices GH(n; G) of size n with entries from G are known to exist including the families: n = 2p'\ G = Z~ (Jungnickel [7] , Street [12] ); n = 4p", G = Zjl (Dawson [2] ; and n = (p" -l)p", In this section we use sets of mutually orthogonal F -squares and cyclotomy to construct authentication systems. This construction is based on a method of Parker (see [4] ) for constructing sets of mutually orthogonal latin squares. It produces authentication schemes AS (b, v, k) (the numbers represent messages) Table 2 . 
